Innovation doesn’t fit with process improvement programs?

Consider this counter-intuitive point made in Jeffrey Pfeffer and Robert I. Sutton, Hard Facts, Dangerous Half-Truths & Total Nonsense: Profiting from Evidence-Based Management (Harvard Bus. School Press 2006) at 47: “Process improvement programs like Six Sigma and TQM [have] been shown to drive out errors and improve efficiency, but also to stifle innovation.” The quote cites a 2003 article, but does not explain the comment on stifled innovation. Perhaps this has to do with process improvement techniques ossifying a process; or that when you start quantifying and dissecting a process you draw back from thinking about change?

Perhaps when a methodology is applied by a law department the rules squeeze out and deter original thinking (See my posts of Jan. 10, 2006 and Sept. 4, 2006 on methods to prime the creativity pump.). The scrutiny looks backward rather than peers forward. Follow the “LeanTQMSigma” recipe, don’t freelance and vary the meal.

Task conflict? We can deal with it. Relationship conflicts? Big problems!

Researchers distinguish task conflict from relationship conflict, and the difference can be seen in law departments. According to MIT’s Sloan Mgt. Rev., Vol. 48, Winter 2007 at 5, disagreements among law department members related to a specific task, such as what step to take next in an acquisition, are task conflicts. They need to be worked out, and almost always can be, or someone can make the decision.

But conflict among members of a law department that’s unrelated to the legal issue at hand – what’s referred to as a “relationship conflict,” proves to be harder to resolve and is universally found to be bad for a group’s performance. When members can’t agree to disagree, prospects for an effective working law department diminish sharply.

“Professional” and “decentralized” – thoughts based on one law department (AXA Group)

In June 2006, George Stansfield, Senior Vice President and Group General Counsel of the £72 billion AXA Group, spoke at the 18th Annual General Counsel Conference (See my post of July 25, 2005 for more on AXA’s legal team.). In Stansfield’s slides on the challenges facing a global organization, one said “AXA’s Legal and Compliance Organization consists of over 300 professionals operating in a decentralized environment all around the world.”

Everyone would agree that a lawyer is a professional, but who else in a law and compliance department should be deemed a “professional”? Does the term include paralegals? Compliance managers? I suspect that Stansfield is bestowing the honorific on all members of his department.

He uses the term “decentralized,” which is also subject to multiple interpretations (See my post of Jan. 18, 2007 on the geographic and reporting denotations of this word.). His next bullet adds that “this decentralized structure reflects the structure of our operating businesses.” At least the law department is in alignment with its clients, whatever that means.

Decentralized has two meanings – geographic location and reporting

The terms centralized and decentralized are used with two unrelated meanings. To many people who describe law department structure, they refer to the geographic location of lawyers (together physically at headquarters or spread around).

For others, it means the reporting relationships of the lawyers. In the second sense (which I use), a centralized department has nearly every practicing lawyer, no matter where they are physically located, reporting to the general counsel, while a decentralized department has at least some lawyers reporting to the heads of business units.

Confusion follows from people not defining their terms, and from the obvious fact that all the lawyers in some far-flung, multi-location law departments ultimately report in to one lawyer and the equally obvious fact that in a few legal departments there may be many lawyers under one roof who report to different business executives.

What accounts for differences in lawyers per unit of revenue across industries? Patents and regulations

All companies have contracts; all have employees. All companies have real estate issues; all have some corporate activities like finance, subsidiary housekeeping, and securities. All companies have some level of litigation, so these five areas of law don’t account a priori for the wide differences across industries in median lawyers per billion dollars of revenue.

The biggest causes of the differences probably arise from patents and regulations. Companies in industries that rely on technical innovation and patent protection, notably pharmaceuticals and telecommunications and high tech, can staff up to half their law departments with intellectual property lawyers. Companies in industries that navigate through pervasive governmental regulations – banks, insurers, financial services – likewise have more lawyers per unit of revenue.

An interesting benchmark would be “core lawyers” – lawyers in-house other than IP and regulatory. We could refer to this as core lawyers per billion and have a much more comparable metric for law departments across industries.

Four D’s to bring about change

Jeffrey Pfeffer and Robert I. Sutton, Hard Facts, Dangerous Half-Truths & Total Nonsense: Profiting from Evidence-Based Management (Harvard Bus. School Press 2006) at 178 offers advice on the four most important actions that a manager needs to take to change others’ behavior. Being a fan of mnemonics, I relabeled the last two so senior managers can remember the Four Ds.

Dissatisfaction: People in the law department need to be disgruntled or worried about what’s happening. “Our filing system stinks.” Or perhaps, “We’d better cut outside counsel costs or someone will cut our headcount.”

Direction: People in the law department need to know where the change process is heading. “Relentlessly communicate what the change is, why it is necessary, and what people ought to be doing right now with as much clarity as possible.”

Doubtless: People in the department need to see their general counsel as confident. Leaders of change need to convey faith in the value and achievability of the new direction; they need to create a self-fulfilling prophecy, even as they allow for questions and new information that might refine the direction taken.

Dirty: People need to accept that change is messy and can’t be completely planned and cleanly executed. “Treat glitches as a normal part of the change process, learn from them, assume that everyone has the best intentions, and focus on how to fix the problem instead of whom to blame.”

Does fear of competition deter general counsel from hiring smarter subordinates?

“Confident leaders are not afraid to surround themselves with the brightest people at their disposal, including potential rivals.” Hire people smarter than you, in short, is what Stefan Stern, Fin. Times, Oct. 3, 2006 at 8, could have added in his column on seven principles for a leader. A related Stern principle is to understand your weaknesses as a leader, since those bright bulbs you hire can make up for your dimness.

It all sounds glowing, but I doubt that many GCs actively try to hire lawyers who put them in the shade. Few people are comfortable with brighter-than-they subordinates.

Also, from my consulting to general counsel, I have only rarely sensed that any of them feared displacement by someone who reports to them. Far from that, they worry that no competent replacement exists among that group (See my post of July 31, 2005 on succession planning.). Perhaps that shortage evidences a failure to hire people smarter than themselves

Proximate causes compared to ultimate causes

A fascinating book, Jared Diamond, Collapse: How Societies Choose To Fail Or Succeed (Penguin Books 2005) at 13, distinguishes between the proximate cause of an event and the ultimate cause. The proximate cause is the one you notice; the ultimate cause may be broader, more subtle, or take longer to bring about its effect. To illustrate the difference in a law department, mull the causes of a higher-than-average turnover rate.

The proximate cause for the departure of several lawyers, the one identified by them in exit interviews (See my post of Aug. 24, 2005 on exit interviews.) might be compensation, but the deeper, ultimate causes might be the poor profitability of the company or the leadership ineptness of its senior executives. In other words, what appears on the face to be the immediate problem may be the result of deeper, less apparent forces (See my post of Aug. 30, 2006 on systemic problems compared to individual shortcomings.). Don’t stop if you think you’ve trapped a proximate cause; keep hunting for the ultimate causes

To reach legal expertise takes a decade of concentrated work, plus relentless further effort

A decade plus of committed involvement in a subject is the pre-requisite for expertise. Jeffrey Pfeffer and Robert I. Sutton, Hard Facts, Dangerous Half-Truths & Total Nonsense: Profiting from Evidence-Based Management (Harvard Bus. School Press 2006) at 93 state that Anders Ericsson’s research across many domains leads to this conclusion: Expertise results from “approximately 10 years of nearly daily, deliberate practice, for about four hours a day, by people who somehow (e.g., coaching, skilled peers or competitors, or books) have access to the best techniques” (See my posts of June 12, 2005 on Herbert Simon’s 10-year rule on expertise; July 15, 2005 on how to increase “deep smarts.”; and Nov. 6, 2006 on effortful study.).

I wonder how this threshold for expertise could be tested for in-house counsel. I also wonder whether the bar might be rising – does it now take a dozen years? – as the world becomes legally more complex and there are more people competing for expert status.

Moreover, Pfeffer and Sutton continue, “Once achieved, exceptional performance can’t be maintained without relentless effort.” Doesn’t that mean that fluency and understanding in an area of law withers if not used? In-house counsel who want to stay on top of their game must put forth unabated effort.

Of nostrums and fortune cookies – platitudes don’t give useful guidance

Permit me a moment of snarkiness. Does everyone cringe when affronted with a platitude for management (See my post of Aug. 3, 2005 that savages “alignment with clients.”)? Here are a handful of other fortune-cookie pronouncements that sound sage but aren’t worth the thyme.

Structure your law department to optimize efficiency.
Keep layers to a minimum.
Design reporting lines to promote productivity and knowledge-sharing.
Locate lawyers where they best serve the company.
Align your structure to best serve your organization.

It’s not that these faux profundities are wrong, it’s that they apply to any law department and no one of sound mind would controvert them (See my post of Aug. 3, 2005 on mission statements that giddily repeat nostrums.). Often, like hoary sayings, they contradict each other: “choose the best firm for the matter” butts heads with “concentrate your outside counsel spend on a few firms.”

Platitudes also lack operational specificity. “Retain the best law firms for the lowest cost” can’t be denied as sound advice, but how does a general counsel do it or prove it? Fortune-cookie recommendations may sound useful at first bite, but they do not tell you how to spot trouble, evaluate cures or develop alternatives.